Facing the Annexation Project, on the road to Expel the Occupation 5
Facing the Annexation Project, on the road to Expel the Occupation (5)
Written by Comrade Fahd Sleiman; deputy Secretary General of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
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In the Political Program .. Facts and Options
1- ■ The position on the interim program is no longer an obstacle to restoring internal unity.
The Hamas movement agreed to the “National Accord Document” - 2006, which it stipulates without equivocation. Rather, the movement went further in the “Document of Principles and Public Policies” - 2017 issued by its General Conference, in its explicit endorsement of the interim program, as a “Joint national consensus formula”.
As for the Islamic Jihad movement, it does not mind joining the national consensus while enhancing internal unity, while recording its reservations in contradiction with its principled positions, for example, the "National Accord Document" - 2006, which was adopted as a national consensus document, while jihad maintains some of its points.
[On the position and policy of Hamas, see the chapter entitled: “Hamas and the Independent Palestinian Entity”, which covers the following headings: 1- Hamas and the interim program; 2- Hamas in its principles, and the PLO; 3- Hamas in the national dialogues and the PLO; 4- The problem in politics is not in the entity (the Organization in its position, and the independent state on the borders of 67); 5- "Settling" the political thought of Hamas in the edifice of the unified Palestinian political thought.
The aforementioned chapter is presented on pp. 45-49 from the book: "Facing the Deal of the Century ", Book No. 35 of the series "The Path to Independence", issued by the Palestinian Center for Documentation and Information (Malaf; PCDI). I 1: September 2019.]
■ The foregoing does not mean that the controversy over the interim program has exhausted its purposes, as it is continuing in a movement of ups and downs, but in a calm tone, including the argument with the logic of justification that prevailed for a while, but it soon receded after his argument ran (Oslo leads to the independent state) ; Including the controversy in the logic of the sparring, which recovered in the recent period after the collapse of the Oslo track (the interim program led to the Oslo disaster). It is only natural that this type of controversy will not stop us for long, as it does not lead anywhere.
On the other hand, and in front of the real difficulties facing progress in the interim program file, or, as some belief wrongly, the blockage of the horizon before it, the debate flourishes in the field of national action about two programmatic options: on the one hand, the program "equality within the framework of one state"; On the other hand, the "complete liberation" program, or what comes close to it, or intersects with it.
2- “Equality within the framework of the one state”: adopting the program before elaborating its elements.
■ With regard to this program option, there are those who believe that the phased program is no longer relevant, after its geographical base shrinks due to the instability of settlement from its estates, especially after the transition to the annexation stage, and it must be replaced by another program, entitled “One State”, so the struggle becomes sacrificed for equality, and against apartheid, is the mainstay of confrontation.
This option brings us to another definition of the trait of the stage that the Palestinian struggle passes, from a national struggle aimed at liberating the Palestinian territories in 67, to a struggle with democratic content for equality in citizenship and rights in the "Greater Israel", which, in turn, is assumed to be the last has achieved the annexation of all the lands of the 67, and accomplished its constitutional incorporation in the State of Israel, which means - also - that the Palestinian people were defeated in their battle against settlement colonialism, while the facts of the policy converging with the realities of the field indicate that our people are still in the midst of this battle Steadfast in a position, and advanced in another, a long battle of attrition, the last word of which will be for those who do not shout first.
■ The program of "equality within the framework of one state", which markets itself as a proactive proposition, which explores the future prospects, after the failure of the "two-state solution", in fact, is based on a past proposition, restores the scenario of the catastrophe and its aftermath, as our people rose from the rubble, where it still fights the battle to preserve the existence and defend the land, up to the stage of the struggle for equality in citizenship, on the basis of continuing affiliation with the Palestinian people, a cause and stated goals.
This program is certainly not suitable for directing the Palestinian struggle in the 67 areas, where confrontations with settlement colonialism aim to defeat the occupation and dismantle the settlements, under local, regional, and international conditions, completely different from the conditions that control our people's struggle in the 48 areas. The owners of the equality program assume a defeat that occurred in the national movement, which reflects the fact that the annexation stage, as the highest stage of settlement colonialism, is the stage of its decline, its dissolution, its dissolution, and the beginning of the countdown to its end.
3- "Total Liberation": the self-role, coupled with the regional equation.
■ As for the second program option, there are those who affirm that, unless a major strategic defeat is inflicted on Israel, similar to the October 73 war in its first stage, it will not leave the West Bank (and as a matter of first East Jerusalem) for its religious important and its value, geopolitics, its economic, security and military function, its water wealth, and the "vital space" it provides for its population expansion.
A strategic defeat, then, and not a defeat in the relative sense, as assumed by the phased program within an equation: raising the cost of the occupation by maximizing its losses to exceed the gains obtained from its survival. Therefore, there is no point in seeking compromises with the enemy, in exchange for "concessions" that do not produce solutions, but rather draw more of them, which leads - as a result - to the loss of the national cause.
■ The complete Liberation program is the broad title (which, if it lacks accuracy, it does not go far from the main idea that guides it), for more than one vision that approaches it or moves away from this degree or that, and what it collects and unites its links, is the following main thesis: The forces ratio needed to liberate the Palestinian territories occupied in 67 are not very different from those needed to inflict a major strategic defeat on Israel, which places them on the brink of structural transformations, with a structural, entity, ideological dimension that would radically change their Zionist nature, or even strip them of them. This programmatic vision - based on the multiplicity of its presentation formats - depends on building a strong balance, in which the regional situation is the most likely factor in its components.
■ However, this thesis - on its merits - is excluded in the short term in regard of the Arab case in particular, which will remain the war of October (1973) the last of its exploits for a period that may extend, for the division of the Arab situation on each other in the general line, and for its division on itself in Its interior for a fair number of situations, along with other factors, may be equally important.
In any case, it is not permissible to confuse a regional situation centered on confrontation with Israel within a preemptive strategy (some NATO countries during the Cold War used the term defense strategy forward), which is not currently present; and between a regional situation decisively opposed to Israel and its policies, it is engaged with it within a defensive strategy, which is currently present, and capable of development in the near future, and constitutes a valuable support for the Palestinian national struggle with its various program options.
■ The direct political value of the complete liberation program is important from the point of view of contributing to the elaboration of the national consciousness based on the affirmation of the unity of the people, the unity of its national soil, the unity of its national cause, and the consolidation of the historical narrative (which the Israeli side lacks), so it is compensated by biblical myths and legends. etc..); It is also important in terms of the relationships it establishes with powers, countries, and institutions that constitute political and moral support that supporting our national cause, leading to its tangible results, and its important contribution to building and developing the elements of the Palestinian self-power.
As for the mobilizing value of this program, while recognizing its role in the Arab and Muslim domains, and its benefit, especially after the propaganda proposals of normalization and progress in some of its steps, we do not think that it is easy for this program to make its way on a large scale (i.e. it becomes public) among those directly affected by the fire of Zionist politics, whether in the 67 regions; Or - in particular - in the 48 regions, where the masses of our people have found something that responds to their aspirations in the programs of their parties, which combine defending their direct interests with their national affiliation with the Palestinian Arab people (cause, and liberal struggle goals) ■
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The Phased Program
1-The phased program: a reflection of the people's demand before the factions and the PLO adopted it.
[The literature of the DFLP is replete with extensive writings about the phased program. We suffice by referring to two references:
A) “The Phased Program book .. 1973-1974, Conflict - Unity in the Palestinian Resistance”, 314 pages, from the series “On Contemporary Palestinian Political Thought”, from Publications "AL-Takdm AL-Arbi Publishing House" (Beirut), and " AL-Watniah AL-Jadida Publishing House" (Damascus). First edition: April 2002;
B) «In the current political thought of the DFLP ..», a study includes the following headings:
1- The normative feature of the DFLP policy;
2- The phased approach in the DFLP policy, and the multiple dimensions of the phased program;
3- The Palestinian entity in its two parallel dimensions: the PLO and the State. This study was published on pp. 29-43, in the book "Facing the Deal of the Century ...". Previously mentioned source].
Return to homes and properties, freedom from occupation in 67 territories, and equal rights in the 48 territories, with preserving the national identity as belonging to the Palestinian Arab people, a cause and liberal goals, which are self-evident and automatic demands, launched from the core of the reality of the Palestinian human in any of the communities that were imposed on him to merge within it. Because the Palestinian national identity has become crystallized, and reinforced by a single historical narration, it is natural that the demands of each community become a demand adopted by the Palestinian people, so the demands unite without losing their characteristics , and merging with their components into a single national program.
From this point of view, It is not right at all to attribute the origin of the phased program to a specific political organization, that the one who produced it with its three pillars mentioned above (return, state, equality) is the Palestinian people with all its communities , and who considered it one of the axioms that need no proof, as is the case « Axioms »in Mathematics. It is precisely for this reason the phased program provides a solid foundation and high-quality base for the national unity, because its stated goals are fully compatible (100%) with the aspirations of the entire Palestinian people, with all its groupings, classes, and social strata.
Referring to national unity, we mean that what transcends internal unity between political forces in institutional and other frameworks, and we refer to societal unity, the unit of the social components, whose the phased program comes to solidify its pillars, which is the precious treasure that we live with its grace, and we should preserve it, Unlike many peoples on four sides of the earth that are bleeding from divisions in their societies, they find their extension in their political structures.
What the DFLP has done - and it is one of the works that it is proud of - does not go beyond arranging the context of these demands, and giving it its programmatic character, systematically analyzing and deriving tasks, leading to fighting the political-battle in a national coalition framework, that it endorse the form of the phased program, which has evolved text and content, during 14 years, to gain more specificity and tangibility in 9 consecutive sessions of the National Council, starting from the twelfth session - 1974, which ratified the "Ten Points Program", until the nineteenth session - 1988, which approved the "Declaration of Independence".
The origin of the phased program returns - mainly - to the Palestinian people, and not to anyone else, no "withdrew", or a breakdown from it, except in one of two cases, both of which do not exist in the visible range: achieving its goals; Or an extreme change in its objective condition that led to it; This is what we do not see in front of us, even if Israel did something that is unlikely as the annexation of the entire West Bank.
The establishment of "Greater Israel" through complete annexation - if we assume the worst scenario -we does not find it a reason for abandoning the phased program, in favor of another program, which is completely different from it, which is the struggle against apartheid program, for a good reason, which is: The liberating national character of the Palestinian struggle , will not change by annexation, unless we raise the white flag, and accept - with the world - the colonial fait accompli. And this will not happen. Perhaps the broad international opposition that we are witnessing these days over the partial (American-covered) annexation scheme, and many of it are from sides who is friendly to Israel, It indicates what the situation could become as a blockage in the face of Israel, if the annexation is fully implemented.
In any way, it is not possible to compare between the status of 48 territories, where the international recognition of the State of Israel is, and the status that will be established in the West Bank under the assumption of annexation, which will not cancel the international and legal status of the usurping entity, as an occupying power, which places it constantly under punishment and lawlessness. This is in addition to other factors that we are not going to be expanded in it, such as the difference in population proportion (20% of Palestinian Arabs in the 48, compared to 80% in the West Bank including Jerusalem, without counting the Strip), the institutional Palestinian importance, struggle accumulation, etc. ... The struggle against apartheid program applies exclusively to the Palestinian situation in the 48 areas, and it is not permissible to withdraw it from the West Bank situation, in the context of practicing mental exercises that may be acceptable anywhere, except in the field where the daily confrontation between the people and the occupation of settlements takes place.
[On the subject of the struggle against apartheid that took place in South Africa, it is worth recalling the following: The African National Congress ANC-led by the Communist Party, combined in its struggle against the existing system, between political and mass action locally and internationally, and between the armed struggle from military bases in neighboring countries, in particular Angola led by the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola - MPLA with a Marxist identity].
2-The main topics of the thesis of the phased program
The first topic: for getting the right of self-determination for the Palestinian people on all of its national territory requires a phased:
1 - The liberation of the occupied Palestinian territories in 67, and the establishment of an independent, sovereign, Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital, upon it.
2. Acknowledging the right of refugees to return to their homes from which they have been displaced since 1948 and to restore their property;
3- Ensuring the right of equality for the masses of the Palestinian people within the borders of 1948 and recognizing their national identity as part of the united Palestinian people.
The second topic: The achievement of these goals opens the way for the struggle for a radical democratic solution to the Palestinian national issue, which grantee the Palestinian people their right to self-determination on all of its national territory, and reach all its national rights in its homeland, under a democratic, unified, and freedom from Zionism and Imperialism influence, in which the two peoples coexist on the basis of national equality, and away from any form of national, racial and religious discrimination and persecution.
■The third issue: The phased program was and remains, above all, the program for preparing for the mass popular uprising, as it is the distinctive Palestinian form of the people's war. In this, the popular uprising does not diminish the impact and influence of other forms of struggle, political and diplomatic, and the solidarity, support and tangible support that it entails for our people's struggle from multiple sources. In this context, military action occupies, whether in its tactical forms in general, or within the defense strategy that adopted in the Gaza Strip in particular (which continues to develop itself to reach the threshold of deterrence), but the Intifada emphasizes the role of all these forms, as important and sometimes very important leverages for the revolt of the popular uprising, exhaustion the occupation.
■ The fourth issue: The spotlight on the intifada, as the Palestinian struggle formula for the people's war, which confirms the determined role of the mass movement and popular resistance in its various forms, in bringing about the necessary change in the ratio of forces to salvation from settlement colonialism, but rather entrenches the idea of self-reliance, and leads to inclusion the task of mobilizing and organizing self-powers is at the forefront of the tasks and concerns of the Palestinian movement, away from the waiting positions that depend, or betting, on a change in the percentage of forces that comes from the regional milieu, with strong support for this change if it is formed. The phased program is a program for mobilizing and organizing self-powers and self-reliance, from the position of confidence in the people's energy and the capabilities of their mass movement.
■ The fifth issue: In order to achieve its goals, the phased program does not assume, nor does it depend on, a political settlement through negotiations, but does not exclude it, if and when a proportion of forces is created that provides conditions that guarantee outputs that achieve the goals of the national liberation struggle. It is precisely from this angle that Oslo, with its catastrophes, is not an implementation of the phased program, but rather its opposite, it is the model - the opposite that should not be approached, condemned, and turned back. The Oslo process is not the course of the phased program, but rather the path of liquidating its goals.
3- The organization and the phased program have two sides to one topic: the Palestinian entity
■ After the adoption of the "Ten Points Program" - 1974, the path of the PLO overlapped with the path of the phased program, and it became impossible to separate them, as they both express the same issue, which is the Palestinian entity: the organization - as an existing fact - reflects the national entity with its representative position of the people and its cause and self-determination; the phased program (at the heart of which is the independent state on the borders of the 67, and with it the right of return for refugees, and equality for the masses of our people in the 48), expresses this entity reality, as a goal of struggle that is being worked towards.
■ The recognition of the organization, as a political entity that elicits rights, has become a recognition of the independent state, which is - in turn - recognition of the organization. And because it is no longer possible to separate the organization and its program, it is neither logical, nor anything from the historical secretariat, that the affiliation is emphasized to the organization, while denying its program, or even with turning back for it, without which the organization would not have reached the role and status it reached and influence, whoever took the path of the organization, took his " tool " with him, without this "tool" he would not reach anywhere. Certainly, the organization would not have witnessed this decline in status and role, had it not been for its official leadership to take the path of the Oslo Accords, so it separated the program from its holders (i.e. the organization), which led to known results.
■ From this equation that gathered, and unified between the organization and its program, the condition of its success was held externally, so the PLO launched under the banner of the phased program to the world, to achieve the broadest recognition of national rights, and cemented the status of these rights - with varying degrees of rooting - in 138 countries, and in continental organizations, in the International Court of Justice and other institutions operating within the framework of the United Nations, and in forums of international legitimacy, etc. The condition of its success was held internally, and it was launched under the banner of the phased program, raising the slogan: “Freedom and Independence”, the first uprisings (1987-1993), and the second (2000-2004).
4- The phased program: the compulsory path to achieving national rights
■ From the above, on the basis of the struggles and steadfastness of our people in the field, we draw the following: 1 - Without the representative position of the organization in its approved program (phased program), these impressive political results could not be achieved, internally and externally; 2- The international support that we seek in the immediate term to confront the annexation plan and the deal of the century (expanding recognition of the state of Palestine and other national rights + prosecution and punishment of Israel for its crimes + enhancing the representation of Palestine in international institutions + activating the boycott campaign - BDS, ...), this support will not be built, nor will it extend, except on the basis of previous decisions on the above-mentioned of international levels. And all of them were carried out on the basis of the phased program of its introductions, and not beyond it. The settlement condemnation - for example - by the six Security Council resolutions (446-1978 + 452-1979 + 465-1980 + 476-1980 + 478-1980 + 2334-2016) The existing settlement in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and not in West Jerusalem, the Negev, or Galilee ... and the text on the Palestinian state and its recognition, shall be on the borders of the 67, and not on the 1947 division lines, not to mention the borders of Palestine - the Mandate.
■ The Palestinian situation - in general - is aware that the internationalization of the national issue, while important, does not exceed being one of the active actors in shaping the proportion of forces in the ongoing conflict, the crucial and most important factor is what is going on in the field. However, no one can ignore the importance of the battle over national rights at the international level, from the Mandate period to the present day.
In this field in particular, the organization is still in an advanced position, which should be safeguarded, strengthened, and not underestimated, given that none of the international legitimacy decisions have been implemented yet; This talk - on its authenticity - does not fulfill the subject's right for the following reason: The ratio of forces needed to make an international decision differs from that necessary to implement it. There is a gap between the two, which is only filled by realities in the field. As long as the data of the region and the world are what they are, alone improving the balance of power in our favor to a certain degree is the guarantor of including Security Council resolutions under Chapter Seven that imposes their implementation by force, if necessary.
■ The difficulties that currently surround the Palestinian cause require - benefiting from the steadfast internationalization of our national cause - the restoration of elements of Palestinian power: a popular uprising and resistance + internal unity + mobilizing the energies of the Palestinian people everywhere.
The phased program is able to carry the burden of the stage, without conflict with any of the other program options; The choice of the program of "equality within the framework of the one state" revolves around the assumption of the worst of the worst, which is not endorsed by the facts of the conflict; and the "complete liberation" program ((perhaps more accurately, it is called the "complete violation" program of the balance of powers)), and we do not see it moving outside the phased program options.
The phased program officially adopted by Hamas Movement is practically the "joint national program" whose guarantor strength lies in its continuity (within the condition it produced) in its realism and its unifying dynamism, which is the normative program that, if not previously achieved, is difficult to disagree with. The phased approach remains the normative approach nationally, as it reflects the political partnerships of a national movement, which also draws its strength from its pluralism ■
To read previous sections of the article, please click on the links below:
https://group194.net/english/article/66553
https://group194.net/english/article/66586
https://group194.net/english/article/66622
https://group194.net/english/article/66699