In the face of the Annexation Project Topics in the Palestinian Political System

In the face of the Annexation Project

Topics in the Palestinian Political System

Written by Comrade Fahd Sleiman; deputy Secretary General of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine

First - In the face of the annexation project, on the road to defeat the settlement occupation.

Second - Topics in the Palestinian Political System.

Firstly : In the face of the annexation project, on the road to expel settler colonialism

■ Over a little more than a quarter of a century, from the Madrid-Washington negotiations (10/30/1991), until the inauguration of Donald Trump as President of the United States (20/2/2017), 4 American Presidents have received (George HW Bush, Bill Clinton, George Bush Jr, Barack Obama ) the file of the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations and they all failed to bring the Palestinian-Israeli conflict to a political settlement.

■ Despite the apparent bias of the American position on the Israeli side, and its permanent lack of integrity, transparency and neutrality together, successive American administrations were keen to preserve the minimum foundations and standards that kept the American role as an acceptable mediator, from the official Palestinian side, including: dependence 4 June borders «with an agreed-upon exchange of land» as a basis for drawing the borders; A negative attitude towards settlement ranged from softness, such as saying that it constitutes an obstacle to reaching a solution, (what he meant in practice: accepting it as a fait accompli, with expressing dissatisfaction with it, or transient protest against it); such as the stance taken by the Obama administration in the Security Council in passing draft resolution 2334 (December 2016) without declaring the veto to overthrow it, which condemns settlement, and considers it a violation of international legitimacy, and affirms Jerusalem as part of the occupied Palestinian territory in 1967.

Among these foundations as well: Adherence to Resolution 242 as a basis and reference for the political process + resolving the refugee issue within several options, including, in addition to the settlement that is (Basically rejected), the containing of the Palestinian state to numbers of them, with a symbolic return only, of limited numbers to the 48 areas + Direct borders of the State of Palestine with Jordan, even though there are multinational forces on the borders of the valley (Clinton's proposals), or by stationing American forces (John Kerry's proposals) + Jerusalem is geographically united, on the basis of sovereign division of East Jerusalem +, etc ...

■ The American role was not limited to what was mentioned, but was surpassed by the progress of three initiatives, which were suspended by successive Israeli governments, without exception:

A ) Clinton's criteria in December 2000, following the failure of the Camp David negotiations (July 2000).

B ) The Annapolis process (November 27, 2007 - early December 2008), under the auspices of Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State for the second term of George Bush Jr.

C )John Kerry Initiative (2013-2014), while his mandate over the State Department in Obama's second term.

■ All of these positions and initiatives (without forgetting the "Road Map plan" - 2003, which was forgotten, and which the Sharon government disrupted by proposing the 14 conditions that led to thwarting it), did not have an actual pressure on the Israeli side, which is covered by the political process, in case the negotiations stop or resume, to continue imposing the fait accompli by settlement. At the same time, the political process provided the American side, in the equations of the Arab parties involved in the negotiations, and with it the Palestinian side, the advantage of the site of the "sponsor of the peace process", with the political gains that resulted from it.

■ The negotiating process, and political efforts in general, have remained in place for the Palestinian side, which has had a declining influence on the conflict equation. While it provides one opportunity after another to the Israeli side to build field facts, it has increased the laying of more mines in the field of the political process, which contributed to exacerbating its complications, and reflected the restraint of the American “mediator” dynamic and narrowed its movement margins, to the unsuccessful efforts of Secretary of State John Kerry in charting a new course for negotiations, Israeli intransigence in rejecting all initiatives to stop settlement construction exceeds, and the failure of success has turned into a famous failure.■

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The Trump Administration ... The sharp turn

Entering the Annexation Stage

1- ■ With the Trump administration arriving in the White House in January 2017, American policy in the broader Middle East region (extending from the coasts of the Eastern Mediterranean to Afghanistan) witnessed a sharp turn, which reflected itself directly and very clearly, on the Palestinian issue with the foundations and mechanisms for solving it (meaning both solution and liquidation at the same time); The United States saw, during its reformulating of its political equations over the region, that the threat to its interests and the interests of Israel comes from Iran, the rising power, and the growing power in the region, and described it as «terrorism», taking the ranks after 9/11/2001, and worked in order to establish an Arab alignment in this manner, what - in turn - required the establishment of alliances (at least intersections) that included under its umbrella Israel and some Arab countries.

■ In the same context, the American administration considered that the Palestinian issue constitutes the major obstacle in the way of building the above-mentioned regional alliances, and that the resolving of this obstacle constitutes a necessary condition for the success of its project. From here, the United States, in the May 2017 conference in Riyadh, in the presence of the American president and representatives of 55 Arab and Muslim countries, rushed to the declaration, adopting what has become known as the "Deal of the Century" with its two tracks: Regional, aimed at establishing an alliance throughout the region to confront Iranian influence and defeat it if possible, and from its outskirts Israel alongside some Arab countries, and the Palestinian, through progress on the path to resolving the Palestinian issue and the Israeli conflict, and an Arab-Israeli following, to remove obstacles in front of the Arab-Israeli normalization, and the establishment of the regional alliance, noting that normalization, or building partnerships, is the euphemism for strategic, security, and economic relations, between Israel and certain Arab countries; Indeed, some (as Hamad bin Jassim, the former Prime Minister of Qatar) go to the next step after announcing the "Deal of the Century", would be "a non-aggression agreement between Israel and the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council", which rises above the normalization level, without advancing To the level of a "peace treaty".

2- ■ The American strategy to implement the "Deal of the Century" in its Palestinian track was based on thwarting the international legitimacy decisions as a basis for a political settlement and accepting the reality as it is on the ground, as facts that should be recognized to launch the political process, and indeed be accomplished between the Palestinian and Israeli sides. This "deal", which turned into a "vision", whose elements are released in batches, has been presented to each of the following, through 3 main stations:

• The first, on 12/6/2017, to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of the State of Israel, transfer the United States embassy to it (14/14/2018), merge the American consulate in East Jerusalem in the embassy, ​​and transfer its functions to its authority staff , in order to unify the American representation in the city, as Unified and under Israeli sovereignty, and the embassy’s adoption of the only route for the relationship with the Palestinian Authority, after the consulate had assumed this role.

• The second, on 25 and 26/6/2018, by the holding of the economic workshop in Manama, the capital of Bahrain, under the slogan "Peace for Prosperity", as it is the economic part of the "Deal of the Century", and the regional solution to conflict in the region, in restoring and developing previous US projects Through the adoption of solutions and economic bribes, a pressing approach to address the issues of some countries in the region, especially those steeped in foreign debt.

As for the Palestinian side, the submitted project meets with the Netanyahu project for what he called (since 2009) the "economic solution" to the Palestinian cause, on the pretext that this solution compensates for the adherence to national rights, so the generalization of prosperity among peoples is the alternative to the conflict around the land, water, sovereignty, national rights, and self-determination ... in the region.

The Bahrain workshop had its political repercussions, as it constituted the gateway to a new stage of announced normalization, when some Arab delegations attended, in addition to the Israeli delegations that took for themselves different characteristics.

• The third, on 01/28/2020, in the official announcement of the political aspect of "Trump's vision" (Deal of the Century), at a press conference held by the American President at the White House with the participation of Netanyahu, whose focus is the liquidation of the Palestinian national cause in all its national liberating aspects, within the framework of the right Self-determination for a people fighting for its rights, through the establishment of gates of autonomous administration with limited powers in the cave of the Greater State of Israel. The "annexation" is the main title of this liquidation solution, which equals annexing a third of the West Bank to the Israeli entity.

3- ■ The penetration of these main stations, followed by a series of hostile attitudes and steps towards the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people, represented by the following: A) Closure of the PLO Commission in Washington; B) Cut off economic aid to the PA; C) legalizing of settlement through what has come to be known as the "Pompeo Doctrine"; D) The announcement of a series of positions leading to the liquidation of the refugees issue.

■ On the issue of settlement, the American administration has conferred legal legitimacy on it as "not inconsistent with the international law" against the legal opinion that issued by the US State Department in 1978, which conclusively describes its clarity that the Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories in 1967 "«contradict the international law" ». In this context, Mike Pompeo, the Secretary of State, stated: “In the light of the special situation implied by the facts, history and circumstances arising in the establishment of civilian settlements in the West Bank, we will no longer see Israeli settlements - per se - as an issue inconsistent with international law »(18/11/2019).

David Friedman, the US ambassador to Israel, goes further when he considers the Palestinians in the West Bank merely to be “residents”, in addition to Palestine being the land of Israel (in his speech to the Begin Center for Studies, on 8/1/2020). This, as was pointed out, is what became known as the "Pompeo Doctrine."

As for the refugee issue, the American administration has taken the following steps: A) The call for a redefinition of the Palestinian refugee to be restricted to those born in Palestine before 1984, and thus the removal of the political-legal status of the other refugees; B) Stopping the US contribution to funding the UNRWA budget, and pressuring donors to do the same in order to reach reduction its resources and transfer its jobs and services to the host countries; C) Pressure the United Nations not to renew the agency's mandate, pursuant to resolution 302, leading to its formal dissolution.

4- ■ Announcing the "Trump's vision" on January 28, 2020, moving the issue of annexation in Israeli politics from the margin to the main body, and that policy based on settlement colonialism, that is, the seizure of land as an absolute priority, moved, was marked by more ferocity in expansive tendency.

■ The US administration did not stop at the borders of its blessing for annexation, which expanded its circle to include the lands of the occupied Syrian Golan in the year 67, but rather moved to being a partner in mapping through the joint American-Israeli committee that was entrusted, starting from 15/2/2020, drawing lines the annexation throughout the West Bank, and the separations between the major areas of Israel and the "Palestinian entity" which trapped behind its tracks.

In response to the international positions that were unanimous in rejecting the annexation from Russia to China, through the European Union and the broader spectrum internationally, the United States Secretary of State challenged the will of the international community (5/13/2020) by claiming: “It is the right of Israel to decide to impose its sovereignty on the settlements”

■ So the issue has entered the annexation stage, not only within the limits of the political declarations of the US administration and Benjamin Netanyahu, but the annexation project has become the new Israeli government's action plan, between the Netanyahu-Gantz duo, which was confirmed at its first meeting on 5/17/ 2020, and on the basis of it won the confidence of the Knesset with 73 votes, and Netanyahu announced the month of July 2020, a date for starting the implementation of the project, without this means that a series of administrative and field measures had not preceded this date, and had begun to pave the way for it, for example, connecting the settlements in the West Bank to some ministries of the occupation government directly, as a form of extending Israeli sovereignty over the settlements; the Civil Administration of the occupation has also begun to open lines of daily relationship with some municipalities in the West Bank, such as the payment of electricity and water fees directly from them, and not through the Civil Administration coordinator in the government of the PA. Among these indications, too, is the prohibition of the raising of the Palestinian flag in the Jordan Valley, and the beginning of the demolition of a number of buildings and homes and the displacement of its residents in the context of reducing the Palestinian presence in the candidate-annexed areas.

5- ■ Israel is preparing to annex areas in the West Bank in a gradual manner, starting with the major settlement blocs (Ariel, Gush Etzion, Ma'ale Adumim, ...), within the assessment that external reactions to this annexation will be absorbable, since the aforementioned groups belong to a category the lands that will be transferred to Israel in the framework of the "land exchange" process, which is recognized - even from the Palestinian negotiating side - as one of the pillars of the negotiated solution, even if the Palestinian side objects to this, citing the logic of: “Unless we agree on everything, we will not have agreed on something », whose effect remains modest in a world in which the proportion of forces is decided, and the political outcomes are decided.

■ In all cases, entering the annexation stage, which differs qualitatively from all of its predecessors, will create new facts. It is:

A) It changes in the legal, political, and practical realities of the settlers and the annexation areas, which were under the military rule, and the Israeli legislation has no direct effect (including the settlements), so the Israeli law becomes applicable to it as it applies in the State of Israel, which - among other things - facilitates measures to confiscate the Palestinian lands in favor of expanding the settlement map.

B) It changes in the reality of the PA, in terms of reducing the area of its jurisdiction and administrative powers, encouraging the Palestinian citizens, under de facto power, to bypass the institutions and ministries of the PA, and to deal directly with the Israeli administrations in light of their ambiguous "legal" status, as residents of "the land" of Israel. This means - in the foreseeable future - likely to further reduce its powers, its role, and its relationship with its citizens.

C) It changes in the relationship with neighboring countries, and in particular, with Jordan, especially after the borders are transformed under the Israeli law into Jordanian-Israeli borders, and not into Jordanian-Palestinian borders; the same applies to Gaza's relationship with Egypt.

D) It will negatively affect the stability of a number of countries in the immediate neighborhood, as well as the refugees situation in the host countries in light of their reaction to the new facts, which indicate the enhancement of opportunities to implement the settlement plan (and in its extension displacement) ■

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The Palestinian's Response in the calculations of the National Institution

[Before proceeding to review the Palestinian response to the annexation decision, we find the benefit of recalling recent facts, with the aim of highlighting what must be avoided in the current confrontation to the serious annexation scheme, as it is the highest stage of settlement colonialism, which based on appropriation of land first and last, and « decreasing the burden of the aborigines of the land; From this point, the Zionist settlement colonialism does not differ from other events witnessed by history in the Americas, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Rhodesia, Mozambique, Algeria, ... in its dealings with the indigenous people, whereas the local, regional and international powers that were settling the conflict: ethnic cleansing, as in the case of the Americas; or the displacement of the invading settlers, as in the case of Algeria, Rhodesia, Mozambique; or a coexistence between different ethnic groups, merging with its components under the umbrella of "constitutional patriotism" in the form of one nation on the basis of citizenship, equality in rights and duties, as is the case of South Africa; or any other formulas, but we affirm that the data of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, no matter how the Progress and decline is of its path, It indicates in the outcome of its main line the progress of the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people, and its victory at the end, whatever the difficulties it is currently facing.]

After the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations were completely suspended in April 2014, the issue of the relationship with the occupying power and the agreements signed with Israel occupied an advanced position on the agenda of the leadership bodies of the PLO. In this context, the relevant decisions issued which successively came from the sessions of the Central Council: 27-5 / 3/2015; the 28-15 / 1/2018; 29-17 / 8/2018-2020; the 30- 29/10/2018. (See the full text of these decisions in the chapter entitled: “In defining the relationship with the occupation authority - the decisions of the Central and National Councils,” p. 239-245 of the book “Palestinian Files (1/2): Refugees ... the Central Council”, which has the number 36. In the series "The Way to Independence", issued by the Palestinian Center for Documentation and Information (file), 1st edition: January 2020.

In the same context, we refer to the extremely important decisions issued by the 23rd session of the Palestinian National Council (30/4/2018), including what was mentioned under the title “Second - the relationship with the occupying power (Israel)” - paragraph 2, based on 8 points which are all in the same degree of importance, we are satisfied with mentioning 4 points of them, for their significance: «(...) The National Assembly:

A) Announces that the transitional period stipulated in the agreements signed in Oslo, Cairo and Washington, with their obligations involved, no longer exists.

D) Instructs the Executive Committee to suspend recognition of Israel until its recognition of the State of Palestine on the borders of June 4, 67, and to cancel the decision to annex East Jerusalem and stop settlement activity".

E) Emphasizes the necessity of implementing the decision of the Central Council in its last two sessions (27 and 28) to stop security coordination in all its forms and to be free from the economic dependency relationship determined in the Paris Protocol, including the economic boycott of occupation products, in a manner that supports the independence and growth of the national economy, The Council affirms the necessity of the commitment of the Executive Committee and the institutions of the State of Palestine to start implementing that.

C) Adopting the boycott movement (B.D.S) and withdrawing investments from Israel, and calling on the countries of the world to impose sanctions on Israel to deter their flagrant violations of international law, and to curb its continued aggression against the Palestinian people".

It was formed at that time 9 committees, to implement these decisions, in sequentially, the outcome of its work remained suspended, for reasons in which several factors converged, including: The subjective factors: lack of political will, the division, there is no existence of a single leadership center for the entire Palestinian movement , that is able to assume responsibility to manage an ultra-complex battle. The thematic factors: which resulted of the structure nature of the PA, which is subjected in the main and necessary issues for the life of any society and any political entity to the occupation decision. And finally, the prevailing political circumstance in the Arab world and in the region: which is divided between that which is compliant with American policy, or is incapable of confronting it, or that is preoccupied by its internal affairs, etc. ■

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The Palestinian response to the Authority's calculations

1- ■ Quickly, the official Palestinian response to the annexation decision taken by the new Israeli government at its first meeting (17/5/2020) came. On 19/5 the Palestinian leadership issued a statement, reflecting the following item, the most important of it: “In compliance with the decisions of the National and Central Councils for the PLO; the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. The Palestinian leadership today decides the following: First - The PLO, and the State of Palestine is now disengaged from all the agreements and understandings with the American and Israeli governments, and from all the obligations resulting from those understandings and agreements, including security”.

■ Resolution 19/5, we have no choice but to go back to the decision of the Palestinian leadership about a year ago (specifically on 25/7/2019), in which: “We have decided to stop the implementation of the agreements signed with the Israeli side, and to form a committee to implement this, in accordance with the Council’s decision Central ». It is known that this decision was not implemented, similar to the decisions of the Supreme National Institution, represented by the National Councils (23rd session), and the Central Council (in 4 successive sessions: 27 + 28 + 29 + 30); Accordingly, it becomes more natural for a broader question to be asked, with two-fold: will resolution 19/5 be implemented, and how?

2- ■ In the context of answering this question, we confirm that Resolution 19/5 (although without the decisions of the National Institution with its two councils, and its lack of specificity and concrete, which are required by the new situation), is an important step at the general national political level, because, in the case of the commencement of its implementation, it puts the Palestinian situation on the path of salvation from Oslo and its ramifications, but the lesson lies - as it has always been - in the implementation and the extent to which this implementation will take.

■ The transition to implementation puts the general national situation before many questions, the most important of which may be the extent of the ability of the Palestinian Authority, which is bound by agreements, pledges, understandings and obligations, as well as the realities of the field, to implement resolution 5/19 in all its implications, either in facing with Israeli reactions to stop coordination Security, or in the ability to advance on the issue of disengagement from the Paris Protocol, at a time when previous experiences are still visible, when the Authority was forced to retract steps it had taken in this context; It also happened with the experience of clearing money, when the PA refused to receive it in deficiency, and then - under pressure of financial circumstances - had to withdraw its decision; Or, as happened with the experience of importing calves, when the PA found itself forced to adopt Israeli approval, a mandatory passage for all imports and exports of all kinds.

3- ■ These questions, and others are legitimate, are not only - against the background of the decisions taken and not implemented, but also for two reasons:

• The first, that Resolution 19/5 was issued two and a half years from the official announcement of the first chapter of the “Deal of the Century” (6/12/2017), that is, after the deal had made an important way in completing its elements, it paved the way of the Israeli and American political theater to ascend to the height of the deal in adopting the annexation plans and mechanisms and setting the zero hour to start implementation.

The Palestinian Authority, in its behavior, has squandered the politics of running around, failed bets, and waiting policies in general, many opportunities to respond to the "Deal of the Century" and its practical steps; The Authority also wasted the state of societal revival in the West Bank, in the heart of which is Jerusalem, the acts of resistance that were expressed in various methods and forms of struggle, and the state of steadfastness in the Gaza Strip and its sacrifices in the marches of return and breaking the siege, and did not build on this steadfastness what should have been built, which means, as a result, that the societal political situation in the occupied territories in 67 preceded the authority in the field of confrontation, although it lacked the national political cover that the authority failed, and the factions failed to provide it to them.

• The second, that resolution 19/5 still lacks clear boundaries for its practical dimensions, especially since discussions in the national frameworks have kept it at its lowest levels, under great caution, not to lead to a clash with the occupation, or to constitute an element to explode the popular situation, what loses the PA is the ability to control the limits of the field confrontation with the occupation authorities. Perhaps some statements issued by well-known political authorities and circles have expressed this when they expressed their concern and fear over what they described as going to chaos in the face of the occupation; Likewise, official statements issued by the Executive Committee or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Authority did not hide the limits of its position when it added the adjective "peaceful", which we consider to be superfluous, to "popular resistance", because the only source of violence appearing on the surface of popular activities against the occupation is the occupation itself (With his army, security, and settlers), and nobody else.

4- ■ Hamas stands together with the other Palestinian forces in opposing the annexation project. This is what its positions expressed, and the statements of its leadership that (and with Islamic Jihad) pledged to resume the resistance operations, which the enemy takes seriously, and is accountable to it, contrary to what exists for professionals to launch statements of "earth-shattering responses."

However, this position is not enough, and it will not be so, even after the word is associated with action, because Hamas's distinguished position in the national formation requires that it be the owner of a political initiative, especially in the separating national stations, which did not happen previously, nor is it visible in the present.

There are several considerations that explain this waiting situation in which Hamas shares with the PA, and that from the position of the other side, considerations may include among them may be anticipation, or waiting for an event to occur changes in the internal Palestinian situation that lead to strengthening the role of Hamas in the national decision; but what is certain is that among the most important of these considerations is its absence from the overarching national framework, which alone provides the conditions for the release of its role in the circle of joint national action.

5- ■ After resolution 19/5 obtained the approval of all the powers that it considered appropriate to unify the national effort in the face of the annexation plan, the question is presented to the forefront about the ability of the Palestinian situation, in its "current reality", to bear the burden of the consequences of this decision. Based on this, we answer with great blessings, but rather, with a commentary on the condition of ridding “our Palestinian reality” of structural defects and major weaknesses, and this is - on its difficulty - achievable, provided that the tasks derived from resolution 19/5 fall within the context of a national strategy, not it is limited to procedures and reactions based on scattered and intermittent activities, accompanied by statements that detract from the credibility of some of the decisions taken, as is the case - for example - with regard to a decision that constitutes the cornerstone of the confrontation program, which is the cessation of security coordination, which detracted from its value, and even questioned for its seriousness, statements such as: "We will not allow any military action, and we will prevent it and arrest the perpetrators." (!!) ■

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3 Issues raised for National Consensus

■ Facing the "Deal of the Century" in its Palestinian path, including what affects the annexation, comes in the context of continuing the struggle against the settlement colonial project that aims to seize land, and through this uprooting the people, liquidating the entity, and leading to political execution (politicide). Hence the tactical slogan that summarized the goals of the Zionist project from its inception: “A land without a people, for a people without a land.”

The State of Israel was founded in stages, on the ruins of Palestine, as a people and an entity: In the beginning, the Balfour Declaration - 1917 by the Britain it was followed by the “Mandate Deed” by the League of Nations: Declaration-1922, ratification-1922, and implementation-1923; then the “partition resolution” - 1947 by the United Nations, so the declaration of the State of Israel -1948, which was followed by the occupation of the rest of the land of Palestine -1967; currently, preparations are under way for the second establishment of the State of Israel, "Greater Israel."

■ The confrontation that opened a hundred years ago continues to separate between the Zionist colonialism on the one hand, and the Palestinian people and their national movement on the other, a confrontation that has been constantly governed by 3 equations: survival ≠ uprooting; national identity and rights ≠ political execution; the PLO ≠ Deletion of being. Our enemy wants an existential - null war; our people still see it with the horizon of its right to freely determine its destiny on its entire national territory within the framework of a united state based on equality between its citizens.

On a question: Why should we restore these known matters, which are an integral part of Palestinian memory? We answer: Because it is current, and most importantly, it is necessary, because of the policies , working assumptions, and orientation, drawn from it , which means that the error in derivation leads to a mistake in political appreciation, which is reflected - in turn - negatively on the business strategy, etc. ... resulting in - dealing with some issues outlined in the title: annexation - if it was "legally", or a matter of fact - putting the Palestinian-Israeli conflict into a new qualitative stage, The most important area to decide is the field:]

1-The annexation plan marks the beginning of a new stage, a higher stage of settlement colonialism, whether its maps are announced or not; Whether it results from negotiations, or is resolved by projections; Regardless of postponement, implementing in phases , or reduction of the application area, which we are consider it and other of it possible. The annexation is not an end in the settlement and the usual Judaization context, but an opening of a new context for a more brutal stage of settler colonialism than ever, recalling that many steps that serves the annexation process have been taken, implemented, and are now in the custody of the so-called “creeping annexation".

The annexation is not a stand-alone political-field step, which can be undone by a decision, and the rule: as it came, it leaves; does not apply to it. it is a component part of the "Deal of the Century" with its regional and Palestinian paths, governed by a political philosophy (with the possibility to be accompanied with a vision of faith), a strategic vision, and supreme security and economic interests to arrange and reorganize the region's affairs for the coming decades. Dropping the project of annexation and defeating it is definitely possible, but it comes in the context of starting to regress the stage to which it belongs, until its inevitable decline.

2-The stage that the Palestinian national struggle is passing through is a stage of national liberation, and it is not - as prevailed in the field of national action among influential quarters, and its supporters in that, even for a while - a transitional or intermediate stage, separating it from the realization of the independent state, Completing the negotiating path, in parallel with institution-building, with the standards of a successful country, and supported by what is called “internationalization of the issue” (i.e. expanding the recognition range of the independent state on its borders and its capital + gaining membership in international institutions + recognition of international legitimate institutions of the independent state and other national rights + benefit from international justice tools to punish the Occupying Power, Israel for its sustainable violations+…).

The restoration of the national consensus on the definition of the nature of the stage, and its essential character, with the resulting priorities and tasks, is one of the most important entry points for any project, - conditioned to be supported by national components - to confront, to thwart the "deal of the century", to resist the annexation project, and to continue the national path, what means that the Palestinian national cause is still in the stage of national liberation (by definition), under occupation and colonial colonialism, that refuses to recognize the truth of the Palestinian people and their legitimate national rights, as mandated by international legitimacy resolutions, and under the American project of the solution, leading To liquidate the Palestinian national cause, and to support the Zionist narrative of the conflict, which would cancel the existence of Palestine and its people, in exchange for claiming that it is the land of Israel, the homeland of the Jewish people, and the homeland of the Jews in the world, as stipulated in the racist "national law" (also known as "Judaism of the state").

3-The "Deal of the Century" opened a new stage in the confrontation in Palestine, and on the range of the region, between two projects, each of which has its own strategy: The project to renew American hegemony by relying on Israel and those who align with it (coincide, alliance, or succession), on the one hand; In exchange for the national liberation project, and the rebuilding of the national state, on the other hand.

Confronting this project with its main path represented by the "Deal of the Century", put on the Palestinian people and its national movement in general, enormous tasks in the context of the stage of national liberation, demanded for the priority of intensive return to the field, to resist in all available ways and forms. The political process, even if it stops after the American effort stopped in (April 2014), it was - in fact - stopped, politically and practically, since July 2000, and the International Quartet" certainly would not save it.

As for betting on discouraging Israel from its decision to continue with the legal and practical measures required by the annexation stage, through international pressure (considering seeking to evoke Arab pressure is in vain), if it succeeds, will not affect the core of the issue. The stage of annexation, and the continuation of progress in its path, has become an essential part of political life inside Israel, and has settled at the center of the internal balances in the Jewish community, and the first title on the agenda of settlement councils And right-wing parties in its different directions, even some formations of the filed, and so far have not been considered as a serious opposition to it (with the exception of the forces of the "joint list") but rather - in the best cases – it makes observations on some of its aspects (its range, timing, stage, proportionality between the legal side and the practical side in it, etc…).

It is the heavy return to the field, that returns to the internationalization process the gracious that without it will practically transformed into a limited-benefit public relations field. To internationalization, we add - at the top of the list - the BDS campaign, which the official authorities did not give it the attention it deserves, it is the weapon that, due to not being activated properly, Israel has not yet felt the extent of the harm it can do to it, even if it started a while ago to be careful of it. Through the formation of bodies concerned with following up the BDS file, to confront it, as a stand-alone issue, with providing the necessary budgets, as well as intensifying its contacts externally, to stimulate the issuance of laws criminalizing activities which serve the BDS project, achieving tangible results in this regard, , because of our embassies neglecting, the limited role of our communities, along with the harmony of influential political circles in the West in general with the Israeli policy.

Secondly: Topics in the Palestinian political system

■ The Palestinian situation in its current state is capable of raising the challenges of transferring the settlement colonialism to the annexation stage, based on resolution 19/5, and the national consensus on it. However, it is difficult for this decision to take full effect, unless it is centered in the face of a confrontational strategy, supported by a political system with all its burdening, which does not fully apply to our situation. A careful examination of the state of the Palestinian political system, as it currently presents itself, does not commend it to the superior role, as it reveals loopholes and deficiencies in its structure and its supporters, in which the circumstantial situation is intertwined, which is only addressed by placing a hand on the root of the problem, that is, holding its root.

Not a few are the circles in the broader circle of official leadership that is aware of this fact, and possesses a sincere desire to open the file of reforming the political system, activating it, developing it, and correcting its orientations. However, what these circles lack is the political will to transform consciousness and desire into concrete political action. In the following, we will stop before issues, and we suggest solutions related to this endeavor, so that they may be useful in a debate that is taking place in more than one place:

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Palestine's Liberation Organization ..

Complications and solutions

1- ■ As long as the main feature of the stage that the Palestinian national struggle passes is national liberation, there is no discussion about the necessity and importance of the comprehensive national institution that frames the Palestinian people, guides their struggles, and unites them. This institution exists, and recently, we celebrated the 56th anniversary of its founding, and it led the national work worthily for three decades (1964-1994), before it was retired, after the entry into force of the Oslo Accords. Consequently, there is no longer any time to waste in looking for the availability of the circumstance, or the need for the PLO to restore its presumed role, for which it was formed and launched, for the original sin was, in essence, the loss of this role. The direct task on the agenda of the Palestinian national movement is determined by the consideration - politically and practically - of the PLO, which means providing conditions to enable it to regain its required role in the national process.

■ The restoration of the PLO to its comprehensive national leadership role, which fortifies its representative, legal and political status, and protects it from erosion, and from attempts to undermine its position, by taking two steps in parallel:

1- The accession of the Hamas and Jihad movements, in full organizational capacity, to all the organizations and bodies of the organization.

2- Reactivating the role of the General Command and Thunderbolt organizations in all the organization’s bodies and institutions, which means the occupation of the sites they once occupied. By this, the Palestinian factional contract has been completed with all its directions and components, in the context of overcoming division and restoring internal unity or completing national unity, or other terms that reflect the same meaning.

■ Rebuilding the internal unit is - at the same time - a very important step for the development of the Organization (or its rebuilding) conditions; The completion of political representation is an essential component in activating and strengthening the role of the Organization. The national action factions have unanimously agreed, in more than one dialogue station, and on many occasions on the adoption of comprehensive elections (for the National and Legislative Council and the Presidency of the Authority) as a way to rebuild the internal unity.

2- ■ The factional consensus on the elections did not lead to a result after many attempts. It is unlikely to lead to it in the visible range. It has been clear that linking the files of the organization’s development and building internal unity within its framework, which are difficult by their nature, to a third file, the elections have made matters more complicated, so how are the elections a way to build unity and develop the organization, while the two movements of Fatah and Hamas, which are still sticking to the "rule", so, whoever puts all its reliance on sustaining his stay in power, the risk of losing its influence in the context of arbitration will lead to a ballot box, which is not guaranteed in advance, especially since the relations between the two movements, which are based on the balance of power calculations, are still governed by the zero equation, not the aggregate.

■ If we add to these complications the disruptive role of the occupation, which considers with satisfaction to the disagreement over the issue, it becomes clear that the elections - until further notice - are not possible, as a first stage of a conciliatory path. Accordingly, the political-practical logic dictates submitting the files of restoring unity and developing the Organization in the entitlement of the elections, pending progress in these two files, allowing them to be conducted in a circumstance in which the possibility of success prevails over the possibility of failure, which we have remained within the issue of elections, until now.

3- ■ In light of this, it is becoming a comprehensive national dialogue, which is the available way for consensus on the method of representation in the organization’s bodies, which facilitates its legislation at the hands of the Central Council, which now has the powers of the National Council, in cases that require it. However, this mechanism still clashes with the requirement of Fatah to implement the agreement of 12/12/2017 with Hamas, which notes the unification of the ministries and departments of the Palestinian Authority in the Gaza Strip, with its counterparts in Ramallah (i.e. restoring the unity of the Palestinian Authority with the authority of the current government, No. 18), before moving to the file of the organization, which Hamas has not yet responded to, and it is more likely that it will not respond to it in the foreseeable future, which brings us back to the first square.

■ Returning to the starting point puts us in front of two options: either to keep things as they are, and to exacerbate the negative aspects of the current situation; Or restore the “historical” coalition factional formula of the PLO (that is, it contributed to the second establishment of the organization when the resistance factions took over its leadership, starting with the fifth session of the Palestinian National Council in February 1969) and providing effective participation for real independents in the organization’s bodies, with representatives For civil society organizations; At the factional level, this means the return of the General Command and As-Sa'iqa to the organization with all its bodies, and what also includes the return of the Popular Front to the Executive Committee.

■ After the first option could not be applied (developing the formula and restoring the internal unity in the comprehensive elections); As the second option (development and unity through the Central Council), to get out of the existing situation with all its drawbacks, the third option, based on the restoration of the "historical" factional formula of the PLO, comes as a transitional solution that exhausts its purposes, once the possibility of applying one of the options, first or second, is demonstrated.

The third option is the option of necessity, not an option of what we aspired to, and what should be pursued further. Note that the actual value of the third option, represented by its positive impact on the restoration of internal unity in all its episodes, and on the national situation in general, this value will decline, unless it provides concrete steps that open the path of developing the conditions of the organization. This is what we will come to later.

■ In the case that the third option is applied, the opportunity will be available to bring out the bilateral dialogue between the Fatah and Hamas movements from its narrow bilateral framework, oscillating between polarization (in the case of disagreement) and between quotas (in the case of agreement), to the broader national and official framework through the Executive Committee in its new form, with the reference of the Central Council that emerged from it, and with an agenda that exceeds bilateral points of disagreement, to national issues; Also, on the site, role, and responsibilities of Hamas in the national establishment. In the same manner, dialogue with the Islamic Jihad movement will be conducted. Moreover, the Executive Committee (and always with the authority of the Central Council) will turn to the authority responsible for organizing and managing national dialogues, instead of calling bodies for this purpose, once they are formed, until a dispute arises over their title (the PLO's Activation and Development Authority; or the Supreme National Command) Etc ...), not to mention its powers, its agenda, etc. ■

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The PA .. Limits of Role and Function

■1- The area occupied by the PA in the Palestinian society, especially in the West Bank, that, according to the signed agreements, or in reality, it has not exceeded the limits of the limited administrative autonomy, with the responsibilities and powers stipulated in it, in versus the obligations towards the occupation authorities. with knowing that these powers have witnessed a clear decline in the security field, after the invasion of areas A in 2002; The same applies to civil powers, as much as the civil administration (the civil arm of the occupation) expanded its role, as reflected in recent years, and this through an increase in the number of the employees working for it. The PA will see a further decline in its role, with the progress in the annexation project implementation.

Defining the authority scientifically, that is, by the fact of what it is, as an administrative-development-security structure concerned with managing the internal affairs of the community, does not at all diminish its importance and necessity, but rather the limits of its reality and its capabilities, without transcending or beautifying. Therefore, we always warned from the negative aspects of issuing definitions of PA, that shows it as it is not and as it will not be, definitions such as: PA is the core of the state, PA is the transitional formula to the state, PA is the state In its current reality, ... because this is misleading to the public opinion and in the best cases, promote wishful thinking, which distorts consciousness and does not help in strengthen trust between the leadership and the public.

■2- The PA exposure to an increasing pressures from the occupation to reduce its role, dictating to us its protection, and not the threat of its dissolution, on the pretext of embarrassing the enemy, who does not give any importance to this "threat", and plans to replace "city links " or "regional links " in the place of the PA to carry out its tasks, but with a local, regional, subordinate composition, consistent with the scheme of annexation, which will versus on the Palestinian side, establishing of a dismembered entity which is not geographically connected, but - in the best case - connected by infrastructure between its torn parts.

from the dangers of weakening the PA, let alone dissolving it, or transferring its responsibilities to the enemy (what some parties call: handing over the keys of PA!), that the occupation resort to dividing the West Bank into separate administrates from each other, at the city and region levels, and linking it directly with the civil administration , Which contributes to weakening the internal unity, And develops regionalism at the expense of inclusive national affiliation.

[Note: There is a possibility that should be studied carefully, namely, that the process of weakening the PA will accelerate due to its implementation of some, or most, or even all that is implied in Resolution 19/5, which will affect its ability to perpetuate itself: 1- As administrative system and structure, and to have the ability to pay the salaries of its employees, including those working in the security service, which will affect the ability of the PA in general to undertake the task of controlling the internal security; And 2- As a source, it is the most important, to provide the required services at the minimum level for society by covering the current expenses budget, at least for a number of departments with vital functions.

In case an event of such a situation arising, the PA and the general national movement will be concerned, of working closely with the local community, to provide a minimum level of the factors of steadfastness to the community, in addition to restrict the negative results - as mentioned above - resulting from the transfer of the functions of the PA - in part or in whole to The occupation directly, and by the reference of its civil administration].

On the basis of limiting the role of the PA, on managing community affairs, providing it needs, developing it within the available limits, maintaining its internal security, etc. ... the discussion starts on the point of providing the requirements for strengthening the role of the PA within its jurisdiction; And it ends - in return - for what is outside this jurisdiction, such as external relations, external security, the National Fund for the PLO, etc. .. The debate also starts of adopting the most appropriate structure for the PA to exercise its responsibilities, including - also - diminishing stations and eliminating unnecessary bureaucratic appendages.

In this context, the issue of abolishing the artificial separation between the presidency of the government and the presidency of the PA with its competent offices parallel to ministries and others was presented, which was imposed by the International Quartet since 2003, on the structure of the political system, to besiege the multi-level leadership role of President Yasser Arafat, by isolating him. . and When the political siege failed, they followed it with a physical siege, which ended with the martyrdom of the great Yasser Arafat.

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In Developing the Political System from within

■ The Palestinian political system has two bodies: the Palestine Liberation Organization, the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, founded in May 1964, and The Palestinian Authority, which was established in October 1993, by a decision from the 12th session of the Central Council of the PLO, where was mandated the Executive Committee of the organization to form the Palestinian Authority Council in the interim period of the Oslo Accords.

The Palestinian Authority saw the light in July 1994 and completed its institutions and apparatus in the years that followed, and it is - in principle - one of the main components of the PLO, but in practice, it is ahead of it in turn, its position, and its powers. Hence the paradox with which we coexisted, and we are accustomed to: the Organization that is supposed to be the title of the political system with all its components, including the Palestinian Authority, is not so in practice, what made us speak - automatically - about two bodies that make up our political system: the Organization and the Authority, not about one body is the organization, with all what belongs to it.

In the following, we will present a number of proposals to reformulate the relationship between the Organization and the Authority, in response to developments in them and their institutions, on the one hand; What allows dealing with the political consequences of the transfer of settler colonialism to the annexation stage, on the other hand:

•First - The Palestine Liberation Organization

1-■ The Palestinian political system, in relation to the PLO, is a parliamentary system according to the basic system. The National Council (the legislative level) elects the Executive Committee (the executive level), and, as a President, the National Fund’s Board of Directors, is elected as a member of the Executive. The executive committee, collectively, elects its president and distributes the tasks and responsibility of the departments to its members. The National Council in its regular session (once a year) looks at the annual report of the Executive Committee, (as separately), the annual report of the National Fund, and the organization's general budget.

2-■ In the 17th session of the National Assembly (November 1984), and after passing several stages and formulas, the Central Council established its well-known form, composition and jurisdiction, and its powers were defined, to include:

1- Taking decisions and issues presented to it by the Executive Committee within the framework of decisions the National Council.

2- Discussing and approving the executive plans submitted to it by the Executive Committee.

3- Follow-up of the Executive Committee to the decisions of the National council.

4- Reviewing the line of work of the Organization’s departments and submitting the necessary recommendations to that of the Executive Committee, which means practicing control work for the organization’s departments.

By this, the Central Council has transformed into a stable institution of the organization, with the authority of the Presidency of the National Council in its procedural and practical issues, with a regular system of convening, at the rate of one session every 3 months (not applied in work periods of the Central Council), knowing that starting with From its first session in May 1985 to our day, that is, for 35 years, it took place in 30 sessions, the last of which was in August 2018.

■ Although the Central Council has a broad role in decision-making, and in defining policies, where the political statement issued by its meetings has a binding force (as was done with the decisions of the Council at its 27th session, when the matter was decided after a debate), the decisions of the National Council remained a ceiling for it, It does not have powers to modify, disable, or cancel it.

The National Council, at its 23rd session 2018-2018, brought about a fundamental change in the legal status of the Central Council, granting it the powers in cases that require it, without specifying or restricting these cases, which means - from an applied angle - that the Central has the powers of the National Council, which constitutes a shift Important in the Palestinian political system, since it places the central on the national level in the reference and the issue of decision-making.

3- ■ Returning to the establishing (1964), it turns out that the National Council enjoyed a remarkable vitality and played a tangible role in political files and internal issues, until the start of Washington negotiations on its Palestinian-Israeli track at the beginning of 1992, either in its sessions are regularly held, reinforced by the sessions of the Central Council Starting in the year 195, or the importance of decisions and programs issued by him in directing the Palestinian leadership. And if we limit the issue to the frequency of meetings between the beginning of 1964 and the end of 1991 (28 years, which is the half-life of the Organization from the establishment to the present day), we are before the following board:

A) During the first establishment period 1964-1968, the National Assembly held 4 sessions (1964, 65, 66, 68), i.e. one session per year on average.

B) In the period from the second establishment 1969 until the 1982 war, and over a period of 14 years, the National Council held 12 sessions (from the fifth to the fifteenth + extraordinary session that did not carry a number), i.e. an average of one session every year and two months.

C) Between the 16th session of the National Council (Algeria) and the Madrid Peace Conference - 1991, the Council held 5 sessions (the last of which was the 20th session in Algeria), over a period of 9 years, with an average of one session every two years.

During this period 1985-1991, the Central Council held 10 sessions, an average of one session every year and five months.

■ Starting from the Washington negotiations - 1992, through Oslo - 1993, and the establishment of the Palestinian Authority - 1994, and to this day - 2020, i.e. over the second half - 28 years - from the age of the organization, since it was founded (56 years ago), the National Council held 3 Courses, i.e. one session every 9 years and 4 months. Note that the 22nd session was not an ordinary or exceptional session. Rather, it was included in what is called in the organization's statute to name the "Joint Council", which is formed from the membership of the Presidency of the National Council + the Executive Committee + who is able to participate from the members of the National Council. The Joint Council considered filling the vacancies in the executive membership resulting from the death of one third of its members.

During this period (1992-2020) the Central Council held 20 sessions, i.e. at the rate of one session every year and five months, but at an irregular pace, as the 28th session was held after 3 years have passed since its predecessor, while the Central has organized 3 sessions during 7 months of the year 2018. ■

•Second - The Palestinian National Authority

1- ■ The Palestinian political system, with regard to the National Authority, is a mixed parliamentary-presidential system, according to the Basic Law. The Legislative Council is the elected legislative authority, and the Council of Ministers (the government) is the supreme executive and administrative tool that has the responsibility for putting the program approved by the legislature into Execution, with the exception of what the President of the National Authority, elected by the people, has executive powers defined by the Basic Law, the executive and administrative powers are within the competence of the Council of Ministers.

■ In this context, and in confirmation of the formula of the mixed parliamentary-presidential system, we refer - as an example of the mechanism for working this formula - to both topics legislation and government, for their importance:

•In the legislation, there is a reciprocal relationship between the Legislative Council and the President of the PA, but the final word belongs to the Legislative. In this context, the President of the PA issue laws after their approval by the Legislative Council, and he may objects on them, but the Legislative Council approves them by two thirds of its members in the second time. The president may issue decisions that have the power of law in times other than the convening of the assembly, conditioned to be presented to the Legislative Council at the first session held after the issuance of these decisions, and if it was not approved by the Council, it would have no legal power.

•On the issue of government, the PA president chooses the prime minister, assigns him to form the government, and he may dismiss him and accept his resignation, but if the head of the government has failed to obtain the confidence of the Legislative Council, the president of the PA must replace him with another. On the other hand, the head of the government is responsible before the head of the PA for his actions and the actions of his government, but the head of the government and its members are responsible individually and jointly before the Legislative Council, which also has the power to approve the budget, and vote on the final account of the PA's budget ■

•Third - Transferring the Central Council to a Parliament

1- ■ The structure of the PLO is based on two legislative bodies. After the 23rd session of the National Assembly, they are distinguished - practically - with the same powers in decision-making, and in the field of legislation: national + central, they resulted from the first body, but also from the second - if needed - Higher Executive Body: The Executive Committee. In turn, Central Council by taking the decision to establish the National PA, became along with the National Council, constitutes the reference of the PA at its both levels: legislative (Parliament) and executive (presidency of the PA + government).

■ However, this designation, regarding the position of the National Council in the political system, and its role in reviewing, evaluating and drawing policies .., since the Oslo applications began nearly three decades ago, is a theoretical one, which did not apply to two out of three sessions held by the National Council since then, the two sessions did not take place in order to review the general policy, evaluate it and draw the directions of the next stage. Rather, they came to fulfill the commitments previously made, or imposed themselves in reality, and only the National Council has powers to decide on them. This is what literally applies to the 1996--21 session, which convened to ratify the Oslo Accords + amend the National Charter; It also literally applies to the "joint council" convened with a job filling vacancies in the executive membership, without which it loses its legitimacy, and which was later named the 22 session of the National Council.

■ As for the 23rd session, it was distinguished from its predecessors, restoring the traditions of work that prevailed in the National Assembly before the Oslo phase, where the 23rd session gathered between the politician with the important decisions issued by it, especially on the issue of disengagement from Oslo; And the organizational election of the Executive Committee + independent members of the Central Council + Resolution of Concluding the session 23 the sessions of the National Council in its current form, having exceeded his legal term long ago; the Constitutional, by granting the central council the powers of the National, in anticipation of an emergency circumstance that requires taking decisions that exceed the powers of the executive, so it turns out that the appeal to the Central is the solution, if it has the necessary powers. And this is what happened.

2- ■ What mentioned before puts us in front of the following scene: After the Palestinian Authority’s since the 14/6/2007 coup that deactivated the legislative work, was transformed into a presidential system that is managed by decrees, and the center of the political system power was transferred from the mixed parliamentary-presidential system to the presidential institution, which now entails the entire government, in addition to the Executive Committee; In the absence of the National Council, which was "resigned" from its position, it transferred its powers to the Central Council, which has become the only one capable of playing the role of the supreme authority for the executive level represented by the Executive Committee + the government of the PA (after canceling the chapter between the two presidencies of the PA and the government that we suggested earlier).

However, this cannot happen - assuming that there is political will at the level of the decision center - except in parallel with a profound development on the situation of the central, is represented with the adoption of another work system, and the determination of powers that correspond with those belonging to any parliamentary body worthy of this name, in drawing the general political path, in the field of legislation, follow-up, and punishment, if necessary, for the two levels of executive: the executive + the government of the PA.

Transforming the central into a parliament and a supreme authority, in a political system that restores its Parliamentary form and re-activates it, calls for a new formulation of the executive committee role and its formation, as a supreme executive authority responsible before the central (that it takes the place of the National Assembly until further notice) for following up the Palestinian situation with all its issues, and for the OLP with all its institutions, and all its components, including the Palestinian Authority. The transformation of the central into a parliament in terms of the role and powers that it exercises in practice requires restructuring it with a view to comprehensive representation of the Palestinian situation, politically and geographically, with all the development that entails in the work methods and mechanisms.

■ This qualitative shift in the designing the political system, strengthening the powers of its institutions, and raising the level of relations and interaction among them, is based on maintaining the established leadership structure, with its simplification (and simplification is an advantage in this context, and not disadvantage), and shortening the distance between the components of the top of the pyramid, And between the summit and the intermediate levels, and the expansion of the powers of the existing bodies, etc. .. This move will result in the opening of a large workshop, to complete its decisions, which is closer to the rebuild.

It remains to be said, that the proposed proposal is the easiest available to activate the leadership situation, while preserving its unity and cohesion, because otherwise it puts us in front of two possibilities: either to keep things the way they are, with some improvement measures that beware prejudice to the essence of the equation governing the political system, and this is an affirmed recipe to the continuation and acceleration of the corrosion situation in the Palestinian Institution; Or adopting formulas that are not yet studied to the extent required, such as the formation of a "Constituent assembly " for the Palestinian state, or other proposals that the condition has not yet been held to implement it, and they - in all cases - do not provide quick and realistic solutions to an accelerated political developments, which Its disadvantages will be exacerbated upon us, unless we hurry to stop its path, by appropriate organizational constitutional measure.

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Palestine's Liberation Organization

Activating a role, Developing structures, or Rebuilding?

■ The proposed in this chapter, exceeds the limits of developing or reforming existing structures, or making an amendment to the content of relations between them, or with other actors in society, but rather to rebuilding closer, in the event that we are united to unify the national reunification with all its components in the umbrella National institution.

However, even if matters remain as they are within the current political structure, or have advanced relatively to the limits of restoring the historical formula of the PLO coalition, with the participation of real independents, and civil society institutions - an important step - no doubt - but limited compared to the situation that will arise after the joining of the Hamas and Jihad movements in the PLO, the development required for the conditions of the organization will include a significant number of detailed steps that the political situation calls for in its successive repercussions.

■ Based on the most important findings of the previous chapter, we will suffice - in the following - to include some proposals to develop the role of the PLO within the available tools of work, which will take their scope and enrich its contents, through its contact with other proposals and concepts, its framework and field of interaction , a national dialogue that is established in more than one form, and is managed on more than one level:

1-■ The restoration of the PLO to its role and prestige is from the gateway to internal unity, when the political-legal status of the organization finds its direct expression in the reality of its inclusive formation, i.e. the comprehensiveness of political and community representation, and with it real national participation in the work of its institutions, it is that restores the organization its role, and fortifies its position.

From this objective reality, we do not extract - of course - waiting for the condition of renewing the building of the internal unit, before proceeding to open the file of the current status of the organization, but rather we stress the importance of the effort made to achieve the maximum possible thoughtful decisive progress, between activating and reforming as possible from the status quo, and rebuilding the organization.

■ Opening the file of the organization’s positions on the course that extends from activation and development to reconstruction, is not resolved by good intentions, but by providing the ratio of forces needed to advance in this difficult process; the one who brought the organization to its present state is a forces percentage, which enabled the strongest party in the organization's equation to impose its political vision, its program - among other things - that the organization be deposited into the margin of institutional national action, within an estimate, that the authority of administrative autonomy is sufficient to accumulate the conditions of the transfer to the state, through: negotiations in the form of the Oslo Accords and their terms (what was sometimes called the Palestinian reading of the Oslo Accords!) + Internationalization of the issue + institution building with performance specifications comparable to those in successful countries.

■ To this appreciation, which some political forces recognized the fragility of its logic, warned against its warp of its introductions, and It was exposed to its seriousness on the national path, we add: The removal of the organization aside, and the denial of its role that establishes its position, exempts the official decision center from the consequences and the “burden” of dealing with The formula of the organization, based on a frontal national coalition, in a pluralist parliamentary system, in favor of uniqueness and exclusivity in making decisions regarding issues affecting the national destiny. It was that we came to the institution of the Presidency, to which the Palestinian political system was transformed, step by step, after the Oslo Accords.

2- ■ Reforming the conditions of the Organization depends on the percentage of the forces that will be formed in the context of fighting its battle, as it is the one that draws the boundaries of the reform and its scope: to activate the role of existing bodies and institutions, develop them, or rebuild them, etc. The actors in this process are not limited to opposition forces rather; it will extend to segments affiliated with the “ruling” circles, insofar as these segments will experience the disastrous results of “Trump's vision.”

The task of the responsible opposition is determined by working to approve the merit of positive change in the conditions of the organization, as the overarching framework of the Palestinian national liberation movement, which will give consideration to the organization and its role, and to its unified national program for the struggles of the people under his banner, which led to two glorious uprisings that drew the borders Geo-national project, to the internationalization of the cause and national rights on the largest scale.

■ The approach to reforming the conditions of the organization from the perspective of forces relations is characterized by the advantage of realism and clarity together, because it charts the parameters of change within the limits of available, possible, and permissible (taking into account external influences). In this context comes the saying: “The Palestinian political system, one body”, to replace the “political system with two bodies”, which is based on: the authority and the organization, combined by the position of the presidency, which is responsible for the executive committee and the presidency of the PA together, where the position of the authority is more important than the position the organization; added to it is the loss of the role of the supreme authority because the role of the National Council has diminished, leading to what is close to its disappearance after its last session (23). The referral of the powers of the National Council to the Central Council, which has not yet qualified for its new role, has not changed anything from the reality of the political system that represents with two bodies, and by the authority of the Presidency Foundation.

3- ■ There are two options for bringing about a serious change in the Palestinian political system, which - for some time - has not ceased to meet the requirements of national action, especially after "Trump's vision" announced itself: The first is the comprehensive elections, the outcomes of which allow the reformulation of the positions of leadership bodies, democratically. It was found that for reasons that had previously been marketed, the conditions for implementing this decision were not met, at least in the visible range.

■As for the second option, it passes through the national consensus to reformulate the conditions of leadership institutions, in terms of enhancing their representativeness, albeit at a minimum, as an entry point for a broader democratic reform process for other institutions. This option still has an opportunity to find its way, if there is political will, especially as it does not involve risks for the Fatah and Hamas movements, which may put either of them in front of unpleasant surprises (as happened to the Fatah movement in the 2006 legislative elections).

The second option (national consensus) does not cancel the first option (elections), but rather keeps it until its condition is implemented. The second option is a transitional arrangement, which helps to develop the political system from within it, and rises on a triple steps based on: a Palestinian authority that manages the internal affairs of the Palestinian people on the 67 territories, with the authority of the Executive Committee, which finds in the Central Council its high legislative and political reference, what is supposed - in turn - two matters previously mentioned:

1 - That the Central Council take over the functions of Parliament, whether of its functions, or its work system; 2- After completing the term between the head of government and the presidency of the Authority, the latter is a member of the Executive Committee, or its Chairman.

4 - ■ In light of the foregoing, it has become necessary to make a qualitative change in the conditions of the Executive Committee, including the formation of its departments according to terms of reference that respond to the needs of the work, as it presents itself realistically, away from the assumption factor; It also specifies the powers of these departments, their relations with other departments, and other institutions. In this context, two issues regain - at the core of all of this - the restoration of the National Fund Foundation and the political circle of their role:

Institutionalizing the National Fund through: Electing the Central Council as Chairman of the Board Directors of the National Fund at the same time he has membership in the Executive Committee, which follows with the formation of the Fund's Board of Directors, and the approval of the general budget, including the PA's and the departments ’budgets. The board directors of the National Fund its annual report to the Central Council, after being briefed by the Executive Committee, including cutting the calculation and the draft of the general budget.

B) In addition to the field struggle, confronting the "Trump vision" requires a struggle program in external forums, based on upholding Arab and international support for the Palestinian cause and rights, delegitimizing legitimacy of the occupation, isolating the state of Israel, and restricting the US administration’s decisions regarding Palestinian affairs, which requires the adoption of An active foreign and media policy with its various tools, which are many and available within the PLO, and among the Palestinian communities in Arab countries and around the world, and this can be done by the political department, to which is responsible for the tasks undertaken by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Palestinian government, in cooperation with the Refugee Department and the Expatriate Community Affairs Department.

5 - ■ After Oslo, the general secretariats of popular and professional federations and organizations, along with the Popular Organization Department in the PLO, no longer pay attention to the federative branches outside the autonomous administrative regions, which negatively affected the organized mass movement and its role in framing their struggles and uniting them in general in Diaspora.

On the other hand, the absence of popular federations - as in the case of our diaspora in Europe - led to the adoption of their own mass organizational forms, similar to community federations, or institutions specialized in a specific struggle paths (the right of return, the support of the captive movement, the settlement file and the Separation Wall, the boycott committees, etc.…).

These popular and competent frameworks have played an important role - no doubt - but they are not concerned with replacing unions, that the relationship between these two levels of organizing the mass movement is an integration relationship, not a substitution.

■ When the attention of the public secretariats (or their remnants) to the popular federations began to renew in the resumption of the federations file, was resumed with it, but with a more aggressive degree, the same super-bureaucratic exclusivity method, which is based on converting the federations into Interfaces for leadership of the political use, instead of developing it with a view to converting into corner institutions In the national movement, it has a real role in mobilizing the energies of certain sectors in the national battle ... and it is not rare that cases in which preparatory committees are chosen by high decisions over the pretext of working for conferences, and they turn into administrative bodies with a permanent mandate; this is in addition to the general conferences held with the incomplete participation of the diaspora branches, or even without their participation at all, etc.

■ The engagement of the General Secretariat with the unions should change radically from the section of rebuilding on democratic foundations, and elections from the bottom to the above with a system of full proportional representation, in addition to reconsidering an old hierarchy that covers that it does not have the required competence through bureaucratic centralization, in favor of adopting other formulas of a federal and inclusive nature.

6 - ■ In the relationship with the masses of our people in the 48 territories and their political forces, there is a need to view the new political situation, where the Palestinian Arab parties (or those with a Palestinian Arab majority) behind the Green Line, as well as the national action factions in the 67 territories, will witness a new reality, It is not possible, in its shadow, after this day, to evade or fail to search for mechanisms for joint action that flow in the course of unifying the Palestinian people in their struggles in the two sides of the homeland (48 + 67 territories) and in the diaspora, in light of an action plan that takes into account current developments in its various aspects What brings to the research the need for new representation formulas, one of the pillars of which will be the PLO, with its power. With which allow the transition to a more developed method of joint work in various fields.

■■■

■ The development of the conditions of the organization, in order to play its desired role in leading the Palestinian national movement in the stage of national liberation, requires progress on 3 paths that complete each other: 1- Gathering the political forces on the basis of the joint national program; 2- Completing the building of the mass movement organized at inside and abroad on democratic bases; 3- Build and activating the specialized institutions and agencies (financial, military, cultural, research, diplomatic, health, development, production).

■ The stage we are getting over it under the prevailing circumstance dictates the elaboration of the executive plans for each of the addresses listed within the mentioned paths, without hesitation, postponement or deportation, as the Oslo stage has folded its last pages two decades ago, specifically in Camp David (July 2000), and it had buried it . The second intifada on September 28, 2000, which, over a period of four years and four months, gave 5,000 martyrs, among the best of our people, under the banner of the interim national program, raising the slogan of "freedom and independence.

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In the Political Program .. Facts and Options

1- ■ The position on the interim program is no longer an obstacle to restoring internal unity.

The Hamas movement agreed to the “National Accord Document” - 2006, which it stipulates without equivocation. Rather, the movement went further in the “Document of Principles and Public Policies” - 2017 issued by its General Conference, in its explicit endorsement of the interim program, as a “Joint national consensus formula”.

As for the Islamic Jihad movement, it does not mind joining the national consensus while enhancing internal unity, while recording its reservations in contradiction with its principled positions, for example, the "National Accord Document" - 2006, which was adopted as a national consensus document, while jihad maintains some of its points.

[On the position and policy of Hamas, see the chapter entitled: “Hamas and the Independent Palestinian Entity”, which covers the following headings: 1- Hamas and the interim program; 2- Hamas in its principles, and the PLO; 3- Hamas in the national dialogues and the PLO; 4- The problem in politics is not in the entity (the Organization in its position, and the independent state on the borders of 67); 5- "Settling" the political thought of Hamas in the edifice of the unified Palestinian political thought.

The aforementioned chapter is presented on pp. 45-49 from the book: "Facing the Deal of the Century ", Book No. 35 of the series "The Path to Independence", issued by the Palestinian Center for Documentation and Information (Malaf; PCDI). I 1: September 2019.]

■ The foregoing does not mean that the controversy over the interim program has exhausted its purposes, as it is continuing in a movement of ups and downs, but in a calm tone, including the argument with the logic of justification that prevailed for a while, but it soon receded after his argument ran (Oslo leads to the independent state) ; Including the controversy in the logic of the sparring, which recovered in the recent period after the collapse of the Oslo track (the interim program led to the Oslo disaster). It is only natural that this type of controversy will not stop us for long, as it does not lead anywhere.

On the other hand, and in front of the real difficulties facing progress in the interim program file, or, as some belief wrongly, the blockage of the horizon before it, the debate flourishes in the field of national action about two programmatic options: on the one hand, the program "equality within the framework of one state"; On the other hand, the "complete liberation" program, or what comes close to it, or intersects with it.

2- “Equality within the framework of the one state”: adopting the program before elaborating its elements.

■ With regard to this program option, there are those who believe that the phased program is no longer relevant, after its geographical base shrinks due to the instability of settlement from its estates, especially after the transition to the annexation stage, and it must be replaced by another program, entitled “One State”, so the struggle becomes sacrificed for equality, and against apartheid, is the mainstay of confrontation.

This option brings us to another definition of the trait of the stage that the Palestinian struggle passes, from a national struggle aimed at liberating the Palestinian territories in 67, to a struggle with democratic content for equality in citizenship and rights in the "Greater Israel", which, in turn, is assumed to be the last has achieved the annexation of all the lands of the 67, and accomplished its constitutional incorporation in the State of Israel, which means - also - that the Palestinian people were defeated in their battle against settlement colonialism, while the facts of the policy converging with the realities of the field indicate that our people are still in the midst of this battle Steadfast in a position, and advanced in another, a long battle of attrition, the last word of which will be for those who do not shout first.

■ The program of "equality within the framework of one state", which markets itself as a proactive proposition, which explores the future prospects, after the failure of the "two-state solution", in fact, is based on a past proposition, restores the scenario of the catastrophe and its aftermath, as our people rose from the rubble, where it still fights the battle to preserve the existence and defend the land, up to the stage of the struggle for equality in citizenship, on the basis of continuing affiliation with the Palestinian people, a cause and stated goals.

This program is certainly not suitable for directing the Palestinian struggle in the 67 areas, where confrontations with settlement colonialism aim to defeat the occupation and dismantle the settlements, under local, regional, and international conditions, completely different from the conditions that control our people's struggle in the 48 areas. The owners of the equality program assume a defeat that occurred in the national movement, which reflects the fact that the annexation stage, as the highest stage of settlement colonialism, is the stage of its decline, its dissolution, its dissolution, and the beginning of the countdown to its end.

3- "Total Liberation": the self-role, coupled with the regional equation.

■ As for the second program option, there are those who affirm that, unless a major strategic defeat is inflicted on Israel, similar to the October 73 war in its first stage, it will not leave the West Bank (and as a matter of first East Jerusalem) for its religious important and its value, geopolitics, its economic, security and military function, its water wealth, and the "vital space" it provides for its population expansion.

A strategic defeat, then, and not a defeat in the relative sense, as assumed by the phased program within an equation: raising the cost of the occupation by maximizing its losses to exceed the gains obtained from its survival. Therefore, there is no point in seeking compromises with the enemy, in exchange for "concessions" that do not produce solutions, but rather draw more of them, which leads - as a result - to the loss of the national cause.

■ The complete Liberation program is the broad title (which, if it lacks accuracy, it does not go far from the main idea that guides it), for more than one vision that approaches it or moves away from this degree or that, and what it collects and unites its links, is the following main thesis: The forces ratio needed to liberate the Palestinian territories occupied in 67 are not very different from those needed to inflict a major strategic defeat on Israel, which places them on the brink of structural transformations, with a structural, entity, ideological dimension that would radically change their Zionist nature, or even strip them of them. This programmatic vision - based on the multiplicity of its presentation formats - depends on building a strong balance, in which the regional situation is the most likely factor in its components.

■ However, this thesis - on its merits - is excluded in the short term in regard of the Arab case in particular, which will remain the war of October (1973) the last of its exploits for a period that may extend, for the division of the Arab situation on each other in the general line, and for its division on itself in Its interior for a fair number of situations, along with other factors, may be equally important.

In any case, it is not permissible to confuse a regional situation centered on confrontation with Israel within a preemptive strategy (some NATO countries during the Cold War used the term defense strategy forward), which is not currently present; and between a regional situation decisively opposed to Israel and its policies, it is engaged with it within a defensive strategy, which is currently present, and capable of development in the near future, and constitutes a valuable support for the Palestinian national struggle with its various program options.

■ The direct political value of the complete liberation program is important from the point of view of contributing to the elaboration of the national consciousness based on the affirmation of the unity of the people, the unity of its national soil, the unity of its national cause, and the consolidation of the historical narrative (which the Israeli side lacks), so it is compensated by biblical myths and legends. etc..); It is also important in terms of the relationships it establishes with powers, countries, and institutions that constitute political and moral support that supporting our national cause, leading to its tangible results, and its important contribution to building and developing the elements of the Palestinian self-power.

As for the mobilizing value of this program, while recognizing its role in the Arab and Muslim domains, and its benefit, especially after the propaganda proposals of normalization and progress in some of its steps, we do not think that it is easy for this program to make its way on a large scale (i.e. it becomes public) among those directly affected by the fire of Zionist politics, whether in the 67 regions; Or - in particular - in the 48 regions, where the masses of our people have found something that responds to their aspirations in the programs of their parties, which combine defending their direct interests with their national affiliation with the Palestinian Arab people (cause, and liberal struggle goals) ■

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The Interim Program

Renewed current

1-The Interim Program: a reflection of the people's demand before the factions and the PLO adopted it.

[The literature of the DFLP is replete with extensive writings about the Interim Program. We suffice by referring to two references:

A) “The Interim Program book .. 1973-1974, Conflict - Unity in the Palestinian Resistance”, 314 pages, from the series “On Contemporary Palestinian Political Thought”, from Publications "AL-Takdm AL-Arbi Publishing House" (Beirut), and " AL-Watniah AL-Jadida Publishing House" (Damascus). First edition: April 2002;

B) «In the current political thought of the DFLP ..», a study includes the following headings:

1- The normative feature of the DFLP policy;

2- The Interim approach in the DFLP policy, and the multiple dimensions of the Interim Program;

3- The Palestinian entity in its two parallel dimensions: the PLO and the State. This study was published on pp. 29-43, in the book "Facing the Deal of the Century ...". Previously mentioned source].

Return to homes and properties, freedom from occupation in 67 territories, and equal rights in the 48 territories, with preserving the national identity as belonging to the Palestinian Arab people, a cause and liberal goals, which are self-evident and automatic demands, launched from the core of the reality of the Palestinian human in any of the communities that were imposed on him to merge within it. Because the Palestinian national identity has become crystallized, and reinforced by a single historical narration, it is natural that the demands of each community become a demand adopted by the Palestinian people, so the demands unite without losing their characteristics , and merging with their components into a single national Program.

From this point of view, It is not right at all to attribute the origin of the Interim Program to a specific political organization, that the one who produced it with its three pillars mentioned above (return, state, equality) is the Palestinian people with all its communities , and who considered it one of the axioms that need no proof, as is the case « Axioms »in Mathematics. It is precisely for this reason the Interim Program provides a solid foundation and high-quality base for the national unity, because its stated goals are fully compatible (100%) with the aspirations of the entire Palestinian people, with all its groupings, classes, and social strata.

Referring to national unity, we mean that what transcends internal unity between political forces in institutional and other frameworks, and we refer to societal unity, the unit of the social components, whose the Interim Program comes to solidify its pillars, which is the precious treasure that we live with its grace, and we should preserve it, Unlike many peoples on four sides of the earth that are bleeding from divisions in their societies, they find their extension in their political structures.

What the DFLP has done - and it is one of the works that it is proud of - does not go beyond arranging the context of these demands, and giving it its programmatic character, systematically analyzing and deriving tasks, leading to fighting the political-battle in a national coalition framework, that it endorse the form of the Interim Program, which has evolved text and content, during 14 years, to gain more specificity and tangibility in 9 consecutive sessions of the National Council, starting from the twelfth session - 1974, which ratified the "Ten Points Program", until the nineteenth session - 1988, which approved the "Declaration of Independence".

The origin of the Interim Program returns - mainly - to the Palestinian people, and not to anyone else, no "withdrew", or a breakdown from it, except in one of two cases, both of which do not exist in the visible range: achieving its goals; Or an extreme change in its objective condition that led to it; This is what we do not see in front of us, even if Israel did something that is unlikely as the annexation of the entire West Bank.

The establishment of "Greater Israel" through complete annexation - if we assume the worst scenario -we does not find it a reason for abandoning the Interim Program, in favor of another Program, which is completely different from it, which is the struggle against apartheid Program, for a good reason, which is: The liberating national character of the Palestinian struggle , will not change by annexation, unless we raise the white flag, and accept - with the world - the colonial fait accompli. And this will not happen. Perhaps the broad international opposition that we are witnessing these days over the partial (American-covered) annexation scheme, and many of it are from sides who is friendly to Israel, It indicates what the situation could become as a blockage in the face of Israel, if the annexation is fully implemented.

In any way, it is not possible to compare between the status of 48 territories, where the international recognition of the State of Israel is, and the status that will be established in the West Bank under the assumption of annexation, which will not cancel the international and legal status of the usurping entity, as an occupying power, which places it constantly under punishment and lawlessness. This is in addition to other factors that we are not going to be expanded in it, such as the difference in population proportion (20% of Palestinian Arabs in the 48, compared to 80% in the West Bank including Jerusalem, without counting the Strip), the institutional Palestinian importance, struggle accumulation, etc. ... The struggle against apartheid Program applies exclusively to the Palestinian situation in the 48 areas, and it is not permissible to withdraw it from the West Bank situation, in the context of practicing mental exercises that may be acceptable anywhere, except in the field where the daily confrontation between the people and the occupation of settlements takes place.

[On the subject of the struggle against apartheid that took place in South Africa, it is worth recalling the following: The African National Congress ANC-led by the Communist Party, combined in its struggle against the existing system, between political and mass action locally and internationally, and between the armed struggle from military bases in neighboring countries, in particular Angola led by the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola - MPLA with a Marxist identity].

2-The main topics of the thesis of the Interim Program

The first topic: for getting the right of self-determination for the Palestinian people on all of its national territory requires an Interim :

1 - The liberation of the occupied Palestinian territories in 67, and the establishment of an independent, sovereign, Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital, upon it.

2. Acknowledging the right of refugees to return to their homes from which they have been displaced since 1948 and to restore their property;

3- Ensuring the right of equality for the masses of the Palestinian people within the borders of 1948 and recognizing their national identity as part of the united Palestinian people.

The second topic: The achievement of these goals opens the way for the struggle for a radical democratic solution to the Palestinian national issue, which grantee the Palestinian people their right to self-determination on all of its national territory, and reach all its national rights in its homeland, under a democratic, unified, and freedom from Zionism and Imperialism influence, in which the two peoples coexist on the basis of national equality, and away from any form of national, racial and religious discrimination and persecution.

■The third issue: The Interim Program was and remains, above all, the Program for preparing for the mass popular uprising, as it is the distinctive Palestinian form of the people's war. In this, the popular uprising does not diminish the impact and influence of other forms of struggle, political and diplomatic, and the solidarity, support and tangible support that it entails for our people's struggle from multiple sources. In this context, military action occupies, whether in its tactical forms in general, or within the defense strategy that adopted in the Gaza Strip in particular (which continues to develop itself to reach the threshold of deterrence), but the Intifada emphasizes the role of all these forms, as important and sometimes very important leverages for the revolt of the popular uprising, exhaustion the occupation.

■ The fourth issue: The spotlight on the intifada, as the Palestinian struggle formula for the people's war, which confirms the determined role of the mass movement and popular resistance in its various forms, in bringing about the necessary change in the ratio of forces to salvation from settlement colonialism, but rather entrenches the idea of self-reliance, and leads to inclusion the task of mobilizing and organizing self-powers is at the forefront of the tasks and concerns of the Palestinian movement, away from the waiting positions that depend, or betting, on a change in the percentage of forces that comes from the regional milieu, with strong support for this change if it is formed. The Interim Program is a Program for mobilizing and organizing self-powers and self-reliance, from the position of confidence in the people's energy and the capabilities of their mass movement.

■ The fifth issue: In order to achieve its goals, the Interim Program does not assume, nor does it depend on, a political settlement through negotiations, but does not exclude it, if and when a proportion of forces is created that provides conditions that guarantee outputs that achieve the goals of the national liberation struggle. It is precisely from this angle that Oslo, with its catastrophes, is not an implementation of the Interim Program, but rather its opposite, it is the model - the opposite that should not be approached, condemned, and turned back. The Oslo process is not the course of the Interim Program, but rather the path of liquidating its goals.

3- The organization and the Interim program have two sides to one topic: the Palestinian entity

■ After the adoption of the "Ten Points Program" - 1974, the path of the PLO overlapped with the path of the Interim Program, and it became impossible to separate them, as they both express the same issue, which is the Palestinian entity: the organization - as an existing fact - reflects the national entity with its representative position of the people and its cause and self-determination; the Interim Program(at the heart of which is the independent state on the borders of the 67, and with it the right of return for refugees, and equality for the masses of our people in the 48), expresses this entity reality, as a goal of struggle that is being worked towards.

■ The recognition of the organization, as a political entity that elicits rights, has become a recognition of the independent state, which is - in turn - recognition of the organization. And because it is no longer possible to separate the organization and its Program, it is neither logical, nor anything from the historical secretariat, that the affiliation is emphasized to the organization, while denying its Program, or even with turning back for it, without which the organization would not have reached the role and status it reached and influence, whoever took the path of the organization, took his " tool " with him, without this "tool" he would not reach anywhere. Certainly, the organization would not have witnessed this decline in status and role, had it not been for its official leadership to take the path of the Oslo Accords, so it separated the program from its holders (i.e. the organization), which led to known results.

■ From this equation that gathered, and unified between the organization and its program, the condition of its success was held externally, so the PLO launched under the banner of the Interim program to the world, to achieve the broadest recognition of national rights, and cemented the status of these rights - with varying degrees of rooting - in 138 countries, and in continental organizations, in the International Court of Justice and other institutions operating within the framework of the United Nations, and in forums of international legitimacy, etc. The condition of its success was held internally, and it was launched under the banner of the Interim program, raising the slogan: “Freedom and Independence”, the first uprisings (1987-1993), and the second (2000-2004).

4- The Interim program: the compulsory path to achieving national rights

■ From the above, on the basis of the struggles and steadfastness of our people in the field, we draw the following: 1 - Without the representative position of the organization in its approved program (Interim program), these impressive political results could not be achieved, internally and externally; 2- The international support that we seek in the immediate term to confront the annexation plan and the deal of the century (expanding recognition of the state of Palestine and other national rights + prosecution and punishment of Israel for its crimes + enhancing the representation of Palestine in international institutions + activating the boycott campaign - BDS, ...), this support will not be built, nor will it extend, except on the basis of previous decisions on the above-mentioned of international levels. And all of them were carried out on the basis of the Interim program of its introductions, and not beyond it. The settlement condemnation - for example - by the six Security Council resolutions (446-1978 + 452-1979 + 465-1980 + 476-1980 + 478-1980 + 2334-2016) The existing settlement in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and not in West Jerusalem, the Negev, or Galilee ... and the text on the Palestinian state and its recognition, shall be on the borders of the 67, and not on the 1947 division lines, not to mention the borders of Palestine - the Mandate.

■ The Palestinian situation - in general - is aware that the internationalization of the national issue, while important, does not exceed being one of the active actors in shaping the proportion of forces in the ongoing conflict, the crucial and most important factor is what is going on in the field. However, no one can ignore the importance of the battle over national rights at the international level, from the Mandate period to the present day.

In this field in particular, the organization is still in an advanced position, which should be safeguarded, strengthened, and not underestimated, given that none of the international legitimacy decisions have been implemented yet; This talk - on its authenticity - does not fulfill the subject's right for the following reason: The ratio of forces needed to make an international decision differs from that necessary to implement it. There is a gap between the two, which is only filled by realities in the field. As long as the data of the region and the world are what they are, alone improving the balance of power in our favor to a certain degree is the guarantor of including Security Council resolutions under Chapter Seven that imposes their implementation by force, if necessary.

■ The difficulties that currently surround the Palestinian cause require - benefiting from the steadfast internationalization of our national cause - the restoration of elements of Palestinian power: a popular uprising and resistance + internal unity + mobilizing the energies of the Palestinian people everywhere.

The Interim program is able to carry the burden of the stage, without conflict with any of the other program options; The choice of the program of "equality within the framework of the one state" revolves around the assumption of the worst of the worst, which is not endorsed by the facts of the conflict; and the "complete liberation" program ((perhaps more accurately, it is called the "complete violation" program of the balance of powers)), and we do not see it moving outside the Interim program options.

The Interim program officially adopted by Hamas Movement is practically the "joint national program" whose guarantor strength lies in its continuity (within the condition it produced) in its realism and its unifying dynamism, which is the normative program that, if not previously achieved, is difficult to disagree with. The Interim approach remains the normative approach nationally, as it reflects the political partnerships of a national movement, which also draws its strength from its pluralism ■